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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE O·F UTAH 
RELIABLE FURNITURE 
COMPANY, a Utah corporation, 
Plaintiff -Appellant, 
vs. 
AMERICAN HOME. ASSURANCE 
COMPANY, a corporation, WEST-
ERN GENERAL AGENCY, a 
corporation, GENERAL ADJUST-




BRIEF OF DEFENDANTS-RESPONDE.NTS 
STATEMENT OF NATURE OF CASE 
The appellant appeals from a summary judg-
ment entered by the District Court of Salt Lake 
County dismissing the appellant's suit against the 
respondents based on a claim that the respondents 
through economic duress compelled the appellant to 
settle an insurance claim for less than the actual 
loss. 
DISPOSITION IN LO\VER COURT 
The appellant submits the following statement 
of facts as being the record properly before the 
Court. The ·desposition of Samuel Herscovitz will 
be cited (D), the hearings at pretrial as (P) and 
the pleadings and other matters as (R): 
1 
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On M.arch 30, 1961, a fire occurred at the Re-
liable Furniture Company in Ogden, Utah (R-2, 
D-3). The Company's operations were conducted 
primarily by Mr. Samuel A. Herscovitz, the Presi-
dent and General Manager (R-2, D-3). At the time 
of the fire, the appellant had two insurance policies 
covering such a difficulty. The first was a standard 
fire insurance policy covering the stock, inventory 
and like losses. This policy was issued by Fidelity 
and Guaranty Insurance Underwiters, Inc., herein-
after referred to as Fidelity, (R-7). Tl1e second pol-
icy was one covering business interruption losses and 
was issued by the respondent American Home As-
surance Company. The respondent General Adjust-
ment Bureau, a corporation, was engaged to adjust 
the stock loss for Fidelity (R-8), and also the busi-
ness interruption loss for American ( R-6). The re-
spondent Western General Agency, Inc. was the 
general agent of both American .and Fidelity. Im-
mediately following the fire, agents of General Ad-
justment met with Mr. Herscovitz in an effort to 
determine the full extent of the loss (D-4. The sal-
vage loss was determined (D-4), and the parties 
negotiated with reference to the stock and inventory 
claim. On May 3, 1961, Herscovitz executed .a proof 
of loss in the amount of $84,923.39, and Fidelity 
then had 60 days after receipt of the p~oof of loss to 
investigate and determine whether payment should 
be made in the amount den1anded (R-34~ 38). Sub-
sequently, Herscovitz had several contacts with .ad-
2 
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justers from General Adjustment, officers of 
Fidelity and Mr. Jack Day, an officer of Western 
General Agency, in an effort to settle the loss (D-10). 
The furniture store was open for business in May, 
but a "thrift center" (D-33), part of the retail oper-
ation, was closed until July 18th ( R-33, 44). 
Herscovitz had a conversation with Mr. Ball, 
an agent of General Adjustment, relative to settling 
the business interruption loss (D-28) at which time 
Herscovitz indicated that he was in no great hurry 
to settle this claim. Ball indicated the loss would 
be settled on the basis of the previous years' opera-
tions (D-28) for $48,000.00. Subsequently, a short 
time later, Herscovitz filed his own proof of loss on 
the business interruption claim in order to cause the 
60 day pre-suit period to begin to run ( D-22, 29), 
although he had shortly before said he was in no 
hurry to settle (D-27). 
On the 17th of June, 1961, Mr. Day said th.at 
he thought he could get payment on the claim 
against Fidelity (D-20, 21). On June 19, 1961, Mr. 
Day, Mr. Ball, Mr. Herscovitz and Mr. Dykstra, 
Reliable's bookkeeper, were present in Mr. Hersco-
vitz' office in Ogden. The meeting lasted about four 
hours in an effort to adjust the losses (D-35). Mr. 
Ball spent the first two hours figuring .and working 
out loss figures (D-35, 36). Mr. Ball then came to 
Herscovitz and told him that the business interrup-
tion loss should be settled, and the Company would 
go twelve thousand dollars (D-36). Mr. Herscovitz 
3 
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indicated that such a sum was not acceptable to hin1 
(D-36). According to Mr. Herscovitz, both Mr. Ball 
.and Mr. Day said the business interruption loss 
would have to be settled along with the stock loss 
and that payment of the $84,923.39 would not be 
made unless the business loss was also settleld ( D-
36). Herscovitz allegedly objected but then accepted 
a settlement in the sum of $12,609.39 which was 
made out at that time along with .a proof of loss 
release which Herscovitz executed. He also accepted 
the $84,923.39 from Fidelity (D.-68). Subsequently, 
Mr. Herscovitz consulted with counsel and presented 
both drafts for payment and accepted the proceeds 
(R-35). 
Subsequently, the appellant filed a complaint 
seeking to set aside the settlem·ent on the grounds 
of economic duress and sued Fidelity, Western, Gen-
eral Adjustment and American for $303,698.46 
claiming business loss and loss of profits by being 
forced out of business. The appellant's accounting 
records showed the Company had an operating loss 
of $16,448.87 in 1959 and $98,078.-38 in 1960 (R-56, 
65). An answer denying the allegation was filed. 
Subsequently, an amended complaint setting forth 
a similar cause of action in two separate counts was 
served and answers filed. Appellant served a reply, 
.although Rule 7A, U.R.C.P. did not call for such 
action. 
Subsequently, Fidelity, after discovery, n1oved 
for summary judgment and it was granted. This 
4 
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Court affirmed, Reliable Furniture Co. v. Fidelity 
Guar. Ins. Underwriters, 14 Utah 2d 169, 380 P. 2d 
135 ( 1963) noting: 
"We see nothing in the record justifying 
such accusation [economic duress], or reflect-
ing any incentive on the part of Fidelity so 
to collude." 
At the time of pretrial between appellant and 
the remaining respondents, the appellant admitted 
that $12,984.39 was paid by American to the .ap-
pellant, and that none of the money had been re-
turned or a tender made (P-2). The execution by 
Herscovitz of the proof of loss in the amount of 
$12,603.39 was also admitted (P-2). The appellant 
.also admitted that there was no evidence that Jack 
Day had joint authority from the two Companies, 
but only single authority from each (P-6). Further, 
appellant admitted that it had no evidence that 
Jack D.ay had joint authority from the two Compan-
ies, but only single authority from each (P-6). 
Further, appellant admitted that it had no evidence 
that American had told Day to withhold the $84,-
923.39 unless the $12,609.39 were paid and that 
American h.ad no authority to do so (P-8). Mter 
argument, the Honorable A. H. Elllett entered judg-
ment for the respondents finding (R-59): 
"From the foregoing and the pleadings it 
appears conclusively and as a matter of law 
that return or tender of the said sum of $12,-
609.39 was a condition precedent to rescission 
df the settlement of plaintiff's unliquidated 
5 
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claim against defendant American Home As-
surance Company; that plaintiff can produce 
no evidence that the said Jack Day in al-
legedly withholding payment of said sum of 
$84,000.00 check was acting as the agent of 
defendants in concert or individually; that in 
accepting said sum of $12,609.39 plaintiff was 
not subject to duress which would justify legal 
action against defendants .... " 
The appellant has raised in its brief several 
points upon which it claims a basis for reversal. 
Many of these points do not appear to have .any 
foundation in the record, and the solemn substance 
of the appellant's brief can be answered in three 
general points; consequently, the respondents' brief 
will not attempt to answer the point-by-point allega-
tions of the .appellant but will confine itself to the 
material issue of fact and law raised by the appeal. 
It is submitted that on the evidence and record, 
this Court must affirm the judgment below. 
ARGUMENT 
THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY RULED 
THAT THE RESPONDENTS WERE ENTITLED 
TO JUDGMENT BASED ON THE TIMELY 
FAILURE· OF APPELLANT TO TE.NDER RE-
TURN OF THE MONIES PAID, AND THE 
FAILURE TO RETURN THE MONIES PAID IS 
A RATIFICATION OF THE SETTLEMENT. 
A. The Necessity Of Tender. 
The evidence in the instant case shows that the 
appellant m.ade no tender of the money the respond-
ents caused to be paid over for the business interrup-
·6 
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tion loss. It further shows that the business inter-
ruption claim was a disputed and unliquidated 
claim prior to the settlement reached by the parties. 
Under these circumstances, it is clear the appellant 
was required to tender return of the money paid 
before it could prevail under any theory. 
The relevant general principle of law is that 
one who seeks to avoid the effect of a rele:a1se or 
compromise must first tender return of the con-
sideration paid in exch.ange for the release or com-
promise, 45 Am. J ur., RELEASE, Section 53 : 
"The general principle [is] that one who seeks 
to avoid the effect of a release must first re-
turn or tender the consideration paid him in 
connection with his execution of· the release 
" . . . 
The rule is not limited to releases and applies 
generally to an attempt to avoid compromises. It 
is stated 134 A.L.R. 6, 8: 
"The general principle that one who seeks 
to avoid the effect of a release or compromise 
of a claim, demand, or cause of action 
(whether in an action or proceeding brought 
solely to cancel or rescind the r,elease or in-
strument of settlement, or in an action or 
proceeding brought primarily to enforce the 
original demand or cause of action brought 
for the dual purpose of setting aside the re-
lease or settlement and recovering on the orig-
inal claim or demand) must first return or 
tender the consideration, whether money or 
property, paid him in connection with his 
execution of the settlement or release, has 
7 
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found application or recognition in a large 
number of cases involving the release or set-
tlement of a wide variety of claims or de-
mands." 
Two major exceptions appear to be grafted on 
to this general rule by the Courts ( 1) where the 
release has been procured by fraud, primarily fraud 
in the execution, 45 Am. Jur., RELEASE, Section 
53; Indian, D.&W.R. Co. v. Fowler, 201 Ill. 152, 
66 N.E 394, and (2) where the amount paid would 
be due in any event. Tex.as Employers Insurance 
Ass. v. Kenne,dy, 13'5 Tex. 486, 14'3 S.W. '2d 583 
(1940). 
There is no indication of any kind that any 
amount was due the appellant, rather the sum 
claimed and the subject of the instant contest is un-
liquidated and the subject of compromise. 
With specific reference to insurance policies, 
the rule is the same that tender is required-absent 
the ab~ve or.· other non-applicable exceptions. 134 
A.L.R~ 108 notes: 
"The view has been taken in .a number of 
cases. that where it ·is sought to avoid a set-
tlement -or release of a claim under an insur-
ance policy or fraternal benefit certificate a 
return or tender of the consideration paid for 
the release or settlement is a condition pre-
cedent to the granting of relief." 
In Lyn v. Business Men's Assur. Co., 111 S.W. 
2d 23'1 {K.'C. App. 1937), the. ~ansas Court had a 
claim to set aside a release on the basis of fraud 
and duress. The Court noted: 
8 
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"Plaintiff did not offer to return the 
amount she received in the settlement and she 
could not, under the facts of this case, recover 
on the ground of fraud and duress." 
Johnson v. Metropoli~an C~asrualty Insurance 
Company, 258 App. Div. 775, 14 N.Y.S. 2d 895 
(1939), involved an appeal·from a dismissal of a 
complaint seeking to avoid an insurance settlement. 
The complaint failed to allege the tender or restora-
tion of the compromised amount. The basis of the 
avoidance was duress. The Court stated: 
"The plaintiff fails to allege that he either 
restored or offered to restore the $600 re-
ceived by him from the defendant under the 
.alleged coercive settlement. Th absence of 
such an allegation is fatal ... A settlement 
induced by coercion is not necessarily void. 
Such a settlement may be ratified by retain-
ing benefits received thereunder." 
The Utah Supreme Court has adopted the gen-
eral rule requiring tender or restoration in avoiding 
a contract. In Morris v. Smith, 76 Utah 162, 288 
Pac. 1068 (1930), the Court stated: 
"It is an elementary rule, both of law and 
equity, that one who is party to .a contract, or 
in privity with such party, may not retain the 
benefits of such contract and at the same time 
repudiate is obligations." 
In Eresman v. Overman, 11 Utah 2d 258, 358 
P. 2d 85 (1961), the defendant sought by counter-
claim to rescind a real property purchase contract. 
In reversing a lower court decision in favor of rescis-
sion, the Utah Court stated: 
9 
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"At no time did the defendant offer to place 
the parties in status quo, an essential to recis-
sion, by offering to be charged with and credit 
plaintiff with a reasonable rental value for 
the time during which she ocupied the pren1-
ises.'' 
There are apparently no Utah cases that have 
concerned themselves with a requirement of tender 
or restoration as it relates to economic duress, how-
ever substantial authority exists that a claim of 
economic duress is no excuse for failure to restore. 
In Meisel v. Mueller, 261 S.W. 2d 526 (Mo. App. 
1953), a release had been executed based upon a 
trademark abuse claim. The Court noted: 
"Counsel for plaintiff in his brief com-
plains that defendant Telephone Company 
took .advantage of his clients' pressing need 
for money when it concluded in the release the 
name of defendant Mueller ... If economic 
circumstances and pressing need for money 
would obviate the necessity for returning the 
consideration before setting aside a release or 
any other contractual obligation, we would 
have very few settlements of litigation. or dis-
putes ... We hold it was necessary for plain-
tiff to offer to return the $600 before he can 
escape the binding force of the _;releas~." 
, ' I ,.,., (' :• .• 
Dawson, ECONOMIC· DURESS~ AN· ESSAY 
IN PERSPECTIVE, 45 Mich. L. Rev. 253, 284 
( 1947) notes: 
"As a condition to recission the party 
under. duress will be required to tender or 
account for the value received by .him." 
10 
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The cases cited by the appellant relate to in-
surance contests over double indemnity, where the 
principal sum is admittedly due. However, in this 
case, there is no principal sum admittedly due. It 
is incongruous to allow the appellant to claim duress, 
and yet keep the benefits which he received where 
there is no evidence that they were admittedly due. 
In the absence of a tender, the trial court cor-
rectly ruled the suit could not be m.aintained. 
B. The Conduct Of Appellant. Ratified The Settle-
ment. 
A contract or release or compromise effected as 
a result of duress renders the contract or release 
only voidable not void. RESTATEMENT OF RES-
TITUTION, Section 70. State v. Barlow, 107 Utah 
292, 153 P. 2d 647 (1944). As a consequence, if a 
person intentionally accepts benefits .arising from 
such a contract or otherwise acts inconsistent with 
the contention of duress, there may be a ratification 
of the original release, contract or compromise, RE-
STATEMENT OF RESTITUTION, Section 70a. 
The rule is stated in 77 A.L.R. 2d 527, 528.:· 
''A contract entered into under duress is 
generally considered not void, but merely 
voidable, and is capable of being ratified after 
the duress is removed, such ratification re-
sulting if the party entering into the contract 
under duress intentionally accepts the benefits 
growing out of it, remains silent, acquiesces 
in it for any considerable length of time after 
opportunity is afforded to .avoid it or have it 
11 
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annulled, or recognizes its validity by acting 
upon it." 
In determining ratification, the courts have 
recognized that retaining the fruits of the campo-
mise is inconsistent with an attempt to repudiate it, 
and have found ratification. In the instant case, 
Herscovitz sought the .advice of legal counsel and 
then negotiated both settlement drafts of over 
$92,000.00. He did not offer to return the monies 
received. In this regard, the case of State v. Barlow, 
107 Utah 292, 153 Pac. 2d 647 (1944), is pertinent 
where the Court stated: 
''As a rule, in a transaction requiring mu-
tual consent, if consent is obtained by coer-
cion, the victim may either affirm or avoid 
the transaction, but he may not claim the 
benefits and escape the obligations." 
Implicit in the Court's language is the conclu-
sion that accepting the benefits after the duress ends 
constitutes ratification. 
In Ellison v. Pingree, 64 Utah 468, 231 Pac. 
826 (1924), the Utah Court stated: 
" ... he had the benefit of able counsel who 
had been his faithful legal counsel for 25 
years . . . Moreover, he was a business man 
of great .and varied experience and influence 
... In addition to all that he was largely 
benefited in being released from the terms 
of the first contract, which was accomplished 
by entering into the second one. Apart from 
the fact, therefore, that the second contract 
was. in essence and . effect a ratification and 
· confirmation of the first one, under the undis-
1'2 
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puted facts and circumstancess there was no 
duress in the sense that the term is used and 
understood." 
Thus, the Utah Court noted that actions incon-
sistent with the agreement claimed to be obtained 
by duress result in ratification. Additionally, the 
Court recognized that legal advice may bear on ( 1) 
the initial claim of duress and (2) subsequent ratifi-
cation, if claimed. 
In Farrington v. Granite Stake Fire Insurance 
Comp.any, 120 Utah 109, 232 Pac. 2d 754 (1951), 
the Supreme Court rejected the right of an insurance 
company to rescind for misrepresentation where the 
insurer knew of the facts a few days .after a fire 
and accepted a premium payment knowing of the 
fire, and did nothing 'till suit was brought. The 
Court noted: 
"One who claims a right of rescission must 
act with reasonable promptness, and if after 
such knowledge, he does .any substantial act 
which recognizes the contract as in force, such 
as the acceptance of the more than half of the 
premium would be, such an act would usually 
constitute a waiver of his right to rescind." 
The old addage of "what is good sauce for the 
goose, is also good sauce for the gander," is per-
tinent. 
LeVine v. Whithouse, 37 Utah 260, 109 Pac. 2 
(1910), was a case of fraud, but the Court stated 
the rule: 
"The rule is that, where a party h.as been 
reduced to enter into a contract by false and 
'13 
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fraudulent representations, he may . . . re-
scind the contract, but the great weight of 
authority holds that, if the party defrauded 
continues to receive benefits under the con-
tract after he has become aware of the fraud, 
he will be deemed to have affirmed the con-
tract and waived his right to rescind." 
Of importance is the fact that the Court ac-
cepted the following quote from 9 Cyc. 436: 
"The party defrauded will generally lose 
his right to rescind if he takes any benefit 
under the contract or does any act which im-
plies an intention to abide by it or an affirm-
ance of it after he has become aware of the 
fraud." 
The importance of the wording is the recogni-
tion of an intention or implication to affirm from 
the act of .accepting the benefits. 
In Taylor v. Moore, 87 Utah 493, 51 Pac. 2d 222 
(1935), another fraud case, ·the Court approved the 
following quote from Shappirio v. Goldberg, 192 
u.s. 232: 
'' 'He cannot . . . treat the property as his 
own and exercise acts of ownership ·over it 
which shows an election to regard the same 
as his, and .at the same time preserve his right 
to rescission (sic.) '.'' . 
In McKellar Real Estate & Insurance Co. v. 
Paxton, 62 Utah 97, 218 Pac. 128 (1923),, the Court 
speaking of rescission as to real estate. purchase 
contract made it clear that a person seeking· to di$-
a:ffirm must do it in unequivocal terms .. and·_not exer-
cise dominion over the property~· 
14 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
In 77 A.L.R. 426, 343, it is stated: 
"While a contract voidable for duress may 
be ratified, either by express consent, or by 
conduct inconsistent with any other hypothe-
sis than that of approval, still the intention 
to ratify is an essential element and is at the 
foundation of the doctrine of waiver or ratifi-
cation." 
Thus, intention being manifestly important in 
determining ratification, the LeVine v. Whithouse 
case dealing with fraud and rescission is important 
in approving language that indicates a party will 
lose his right of rescission by doing an act that "im-
plies an intention" to be bound. 
In the instant case, the facts before the trial 
court clearly demonstrated ratification which when 
coupled with the failure to make tender required 
that judgment be given for the respondents, Gallon 
v. Lloyd Thomas Co., 264 F. 2d 821; Restatement of 
Contracts, Sections 499, 484. First, after Herscovitz 
accepted both checks the claimed duress ended. Es-
pecially so when he cashed the $84,000.00 check, 
since that eliminated the essence of any "wrong-
doing" in the theory of economic duress. Thereafter, 
instead of repudiating the $12,000.00 payment, he 
retained it and sought to "keep his cake and eat it 
too." He cashed the check, exercised sufficient do-
minion over the rest of the compromise so as to 
indicate an .acceptance of the settlement. He could 
not legally negotiate the check after the duress had 
terminated. This is to be distinguished from the 
15 
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situation where the fraud or duress is not termin-
ated prior to cashing the check or receiving money. 
Further, full consultation with counsel was had 
before any action was taken. Counsel must have ad-
vised of the danger of negotiating the check. As a 
consequence, ratification or waiver exists, as a mat-
ter of law. Finally, it is inconsistent for appellant 
to claim that the economic duress still continued, 
since this would mean the alleged refusal of the 
$84,000.00 payment, without the other, was not the 
real source of his trouble, but it was actually his own 
business .and financial problems not related to the 
defendants' actions, and thus his claim of economic 
duress, to the extent it involves a wrongful act of 
the defendant, would not exist. 
The trial court correctly ruled that the circum-
stances in failing to make a tender precluded ap-
pellant from maintaining its suit. 
POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN FIND-
ING THAT APPELLANT HAD NO CAUSE OF 
ACTION BASED UPON A CLAIM OF ECONO-
MIC DURESS. 
· In points 2 through 5, the appellant in effect 
contends the trial court erred in granting judgment 
for the respondent based upon the appellant's claim 
of economic duress. 
As to point 3 of appellant's brief, there is no 
ev~dence that the Court relied upon statements of the 
respondents' counsel to find appellant could not 
16 
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prove .a claim based on economic duress. The record 
shows that the appellant's counsel admitted no "dur-
ess of goods" and that the Court based upon the best 
evidence the appellant could offer, correctly ruled 
that no claim of economic duress could be sustained. 
The essence of the claim of appellant is one of 
duress. At common law, duress of .an economic na-
ture was usually associated with the detention of a 
person's goods or chattel to extract an unnecessarily 
rigorous payment. Astky v. Reynolds, 2 Strange 
915, K.B. 1732 :· 
'!'We think also, that this is a payment by 
compulsion; the plaintiff might have such an 
immediate want of his goods, that an action 
in trover would not do his business where the 
rule volenti nonfit injura is applied . . ." 
The common law concept was therefore pri-
marily limited to duress of goods. 13 C.J., CON:.. 
TRACTS, Section 316(3). However, the common 
law theory of "economic duress" h.as been expanded. 
17A Am. Jur., Duress and Undue lnflence, Section 
7, notes: 
"There is no doubt that the early common 
law doctrine of duress h.as gradually ex-
panded and broken through its original limi:.. 
tations, with the result that many states have 
adopted the modern doctrine of 'business com-
pulsion' or what is sometiPieS referred to as 
'economic duress or compulsion'." 
As to what specifically amounts to economic 
duress, the texts and authorities have more often 
spoken in terms of what it is not, 17 A Am. Jur., 
1'7 
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DURESS AND UNDUE INFLUENCE, Section 7, 
notes: 
" 'Business compulsion' is not established 
merely by proof that consent was secured by 
the pressure of financial circumstances. But 
it is said that a threat of serious financial loss 
is sufficient to constitute duress and ground 
for relief where an ordinary suit at law or 
equity might not be an .adequate remedy. 
"To constitute duress or businesss compul-
sion there must be more than .a mere threat 
which might result in injury at some future 
time, such as a threat to injury to credit in 
the indefinite future. It must be such a threat 
that, in conjunction with other circumstances 
and business necessity, the party so coerced 
fears a loss of business unless he does so enter 
into the contract demanded.'' 
In 17 C.J.S., CONTRACTS, Section 177, p. 536, 
it is noted: 
". . . the exercise of business pressure fall-
ing short of tortious conduct is ordin.arily not 
regarded as duress, and business compulsion 
exercised by an illegal combination of persons 
has been held not to constitute duress." 
Appelmlan, IN1S'UR'AN1CE LAW .A:ND PRAC-
TIICE, Vol. ·s, Section 17'1'5, notes: 
"Inducement of a settlement when a bene-
ficiary was in financial difficulties does not 
constitute duress. It has even been held that 
threats of criminal prosecution do not fall in 
this category." 
In Kelley v. United Mutual Insurance Assn., 
112 S.W. 2d 929 (Mo. App. 1938), plaintiff filed suit 
18 
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to recover on several life insurance policies, which 
she had compromised for $1,000.00. The plaintiff 
contended, among other things, that she settled the 
claim because of being pressed by severe economic 
problems. The Court noted in holding that the claim 
was without merit: 
"Our examination of the evidence causes us 
to conclude that there was no evidence to 
justify the submission as to allege'd ·duress. 
True it was shown that the beneficiary was 
pressed with financial difficulties and such 
m.ay have been an inducement to the signing 
of the agreement. Such, however, does not 
constitute duress." 
In Manno v. Butual Beneficial Health & Acci-
dent Assoc., 187 N.Y.S. 2d 709 (1959, Sup. Ct.), 
the plaintiff sued to received certain accident and 
health insurance settlements. The essence of the 
claim was that the plaintiff had sustained injuries 
which prevented him from working, and that de-
fendant refused to pay what was properly due and 
was forced into a settlement. The complaint .alleged: 
"That solely by reason of the economic dur-
ess practiced upon ·him and the coercion and 
other acts of the defendant[s], including the 
willful and deliberate breach of * * * [their] 
· contract[s] with the plaintiff, and the physi-
cal condition and ill health of the plaintiff 
at the time defendant[s'] representative im-
posed the defendant[s'] demands upon him, 
plaintiff was unable to resist the defend-
ant[s'] coercion and surrendered the afore-
said policies of insurance to the defendant[s'] 
19 
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representative, receiving drafts totaling 
$6, 700." 
The defendant contended the complaint stated 
no claim for relief. The Court granted the motion 
to dismiss, and in doing so spoke of an awareness of 
"modern doctrine of economic duress." The Court, 
however, felt a claim was not stated. The Court 
noted: 
"The plaintiff has alleged, in substance, no 
more than that he has suffered a total and 
permanent disability, that defendants refused 
to make payments under the policies and dr.-
liberately breached the contracts and that 
whil~e he was alone and in bed due to his heart 
condition 'he acceded to the defendants' de-
mand to surrender the policies for a consider-
ation of $'6, 770. This, the p1laintiff has char-
acterized as 'economic duress' and 'coercion' 
practiced by the defendants. However, to al-
lege that an agreement or setlement was made 
under 'duress' or 'coercion' is to state no more 
than a conclusion [citing .authorities]. Gen-
erally, it is not duress to do what one has the 
legal right to do [cit. Ath.]. Similarly, a 
threat to breach a contract does not, without 
more constitute duress [1CA] ." 
The decision is important because multiple de-
fendants and policies were involved which is the 
situation in the instant matter. Certainly, if Amer-
ican had taken advantage of Reliable's financial dif-
ficulties and forced a stringent bargain, no one could 
conten·d economic duress existed. Thus, see 17A Am. 
Jur., supra., Section 7, cited infra. 
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In Starks v. Field, 198 Wash. 593, 89 P. 2d 513 
( 1939), the plaintiff contended he was compelled 
to sign collateral crop financing agreements because 
of economic duress. In rejecting the argument, the 
Washington Courte stated: 
"Contracts, sales, or compromises made un-
der stress of pecuniary necessity are of daily 
occurrence, and if such urgency is to affect 
their validity, no one could safely negotiate 
with a party who findss himself in difficulty 
by virtue of financial adversities." 
The Manno case, supra, is additionally import-
ant since it seems to recognize that the presence of 
mulitiple policies and an effort to fully compromise 
between rn:any defendants offers no greater basis 
for a claim of duress than otherwise. 
In Steward v. World-Wide A~utomobiles Cor-
poration, 189 N.Y.S. 2d 540 (1959, Sup. Ct.), the 
Court followed the Mann.o case .and held "no cause of 
action" where defendants threatened to dissolve 
plaintiff's franchise, which would have been a breach 
of contract, unless the plaintiff sold her stock. The 
Court determined a mere threat to breach a contract 
cannot amount to duress. 
In Doernbecher v. Mutual Life Insurance Com-
pany, 16 Wash. ,2d 64, 13·2 P. 2d 7'51 (1943), the 
Washington Court was faced with another insurance 
compromise case. The insurance company obtained 
a release of insurance policies for a premium pay-
ment from the beneficiary with a threat of civil 
action, where the beneficiary due to her husband's 
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illness could not undertake court action. The Wash-
ington Court found no cause of action. 
In Hackley v. Headly, 47 Mich. 489, 8 N.W. 
511, a dispute over scaling logs. arose between the 
p.arties. One party was in severe financial straits 
and the other refused to make payment forcing a 
settlement for an amount less than claimed. In re-
fusing to find duress, the Michigan Supreme Court 
ruled: 
"In what did the alleged duresss consist in 
the present case? Merely in this : th.at the 
debtors refused to pay on demand a debt al-
ready due, though the plaintiff was in great 
need of the money and might be financially 
ruined in case he failed to obtain it. It is not 
pretended that H.ackley & McGordon had done 
anything to bring Headley to the condition 
which made the money so important to him 
at this very time, or that they were in any 
manner responsible for his pecuniary embar-
rassment except as they failed to pay this 
demand. The duress, then, is to be found 
exclusively in their failure to meet promptly 
their pecuniary obligation. But this, accord-
ing to the plaintiff's claim, would have con-
sttiuted no duress whatever if he had not 
happened to be in pecuniary straits; and the 
validity of negotiations, .accordi:qg to this 
claim, must be determined, not by the defend-
ants' conduct, but by the plaintiff's necessities. 
The same contract which would be valid if 
made with a m.an easy in his circumstances, 
becomes invalid when the contracting party 
is pressed with the necessity of immediately 
meeting his bank paper. But this would be a 
most dangerous, as well · as a most unequal 
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doctrine ; and if accepted, no one could well 
know when he would be safe in dealing on 
the ordinary terms of negotiation with a 
party who professed to be in great need." 
It would be concluded- that in insurance settle-
ment and other like cases, mere economic pressure 
usually will not constitute duress. 
Other cases, not directly relating to the insur~ 
ance situation, are relevant in weighing whether 
economic duress exists in the instant situation. 
In Hartsville Oil & Mill v. United States, 271 
U.S. 43 (1926), plaintiff sued for additional com-
pensation under a war contract, which petitioner 
claimed was still in effect and not superseded by 
another contract, which it contended was procured 
by duress. Mter the end of the war (W.W. 1), the 
gov~rnment threatened to terminate plaintiff's con-
tract with the government providing for the pur-
chase of certain items. The government contract con-
tained a clause so allowing but the government also 
would refuse .accrued obligations. The government 
told plaintiff if he would execute a new cpntract it 
would continue to purchase at· a reduced rate, other-
wise not; The plaintiff contended he would have been 
economically ruined if the government had cancelled 
outright and therefore signeld the reduced contract. 
The Supreme Court denied recovery feeling that this 
was merely a threat to breach a contract (so also is 
the wrongful refussal to settle an insuran.ce claim) . 
The Court said: 
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"But a threat to break a contract does not 
in itself constitute duress. Before the coercive 
effect of the threatened action can be inferred, 
there must be evidence of some probable con-
sequences of it to person or property for which 
the remedy afforded by the courts is inade-
quate.'' 
Certainly, if Reliable would only suffer a loss 
of money or economic injury, which would be com-
pensable by the courts, it cannot complain. Indeed, 
Herscovitz stated he was aware of his court remedies 
(D-38, 47). 
Other cases have reached similar conclusions. 
French v. Shoemaker, 14 Wall. 314 (U.S.); Gill v. 
S.H.B. Corporation, 322 Mich. 700, 34 N.W. 2d 526. 
French v. Shoemaker, supra, is of relevance in 
this area and is a landmark case There four parties, 
owners of interests in a railroad company, had a 
dispute as to their relative ownership. They nego-
tiated a settlement contract dividing the ownership 
proportionately among themselves. One of the par-
ties thereafter contended that because of the danger-
ous nature of his pecuniary situation and threats of 
further damage from the other parties, he was 
·forced to compromise. The Supreme Court rejected 
a contention of economic duress noting: 
"Enough appears in the record to convince 
the Court that the respondent was in strait-
ened circumstances, that his business affairs 
had become complicated, that he was greatly 
embarrassed with litigations, and that he was 
in pressing want of pecuniary means, but the 
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Court is wholly unable to see that the com-
plainant is responsible for these circum-
stances or that he did any u·nlawful act to 
deprive the respondent of his property, or to 
create those necessities or embarrassements 
" . . . 
This case states the general rule th.at before 
breach of contract or pressure on a person in finan-
cial difficulties will be deemed duress, the party so 
taking advantage must have in part -been respon-
sible for the plight. 
In the Government Contractor, BRIEFING 
PAPERS, ECONOMIC DURESS\ page 3, (April 
1964), it is noted: 
''When, however, financial difficulties prevent 
you from taking an alternative course, it has 
been held that the Govt must in some way be 
- responsible for your financial plight (e.g., by 
its withholding 'payments lawfully due you). 
The mere stress of business conditions is not 
necessarily sufficient to spell out the 'no al-
ternative' element of duress (or, for that 
matter, the 'forced consent' (element)." -
* * * 
"If it is financial difficulties which leave 
you with no alternative course other than to 
consent to the Govt's demands, be prep.ared 
to prove that the Govt is in some way respon-
sible for (or has materially contributed to) 
your financial plight." . _ 
1The Government is often pressed with clainis of eco-
nomic duress, in contract termination settlements. Con-
sequently, many of the landmark cases are decisions from 
the Supreme Court or lower federal courts. 
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In Fruhauf Southwest Garment Co. v. United 
States, 126 Ct. Cis. 51, (1953), the plaintiff alleged 
that he accepted a price revision because the govern-
ment had used economic duress. In denying the 
claim, the Court stated: 
" ... In order to substantiate the allegation 
of economic duress or business compulsion the 
plantiff must go beyond the mere showing of 
a reluctance to accept .and of financial embar-
rassment. There must be a showing of acts 
on the part of the defendant which produced 
these two factors. The assertion of duress 
must be proven to have been the result of the 
defendant's conduct and not by the plaintiff's 
necessities. In DuPuy v. United States, 68 
C.Cls. 348, 381, this court stated: 
'* * * In order to successfully defend 
on the ground of force or duress, it must 
be shown th.at the party benefited there-
by contrained or forced the action of the 
injured party, and even threatened fi-
nancial disaster is not sufficient. * * *' 
"It has become settled law that the mere 
stress of business conditions will not consti-
tute duress where the defendant was not re-
sponsible for those circumstances. Lawrence 
v. Muter Co., 171 F. 2d 380, 382, cert. den., 
337 U.S. 907; Silliman v. United States, 101 
u.s. 465, 471." 
See also Silliman v. United States, 101 U.S. 465. 
The appellant's financial plight was in no sense 
the fault of the respondents. Indeed, appellant had 
been operating at a loss for sometime, and w.as pri-
·marily in economic difficulty due to the fire and 
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business circumstances wholly without the fault of 
respondents. Clearly, this alone justifies the trial 
court's result. 
Where an adequate remedy at law exists, there 
can be no claim of economic duress. Board of 
1'rustees v. Wilson Company, 133 F. 2d 399 (app. 
D.C. 1943), where the Court said: 
"Its denial of the right to rescind did not 
conclude the question. Appellee could litigate 
it. Appellant was equally entitled to litigate 
it or, as it did in effect, threaten to litigate it. 
It follows there was no duress." 
Also, Hale, BARGAINING, DURESS AND 
ECONOMIC LIBERTY, 43 Col. L. Rev. 603. 
The Utah cases are not particularly helpful 
since in Buford v. Lonegran, 6 Utah 301, 22 Pac. 
164 (1889), the Territorial Supreme Court was in-
volved only with a duress of goods problem, not 
a true situation of economic bargaining. 
In Flack v. National Bank, 8 Utah 19'3, 30 Pac. 
746 (1892), the Territorial Court again had a claim 
of duress. This case is more directly applicable to 
the instant case than the Buford case. There, the 
bank induced the plaintiff by threat of .attachement 
to transfer funds to satissfy payment of a note. The 
bank was aware of the serious economic straits of 
plaintiff and possibility of creditor attachment .and 
used this to induce transfer. The :Court did not 
speak of the economi~ asp~ects except to note they 
were real, but the Court found nothing wrong with 
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pressing for early payment when plaintiff was bad 
off, noting : 
"Under all the evidence of the case, we 
think the defendant had good reason to feel 
uneasy about the ultimate payment of the 
note, and it is not strange that security should 
have been demanded." 
This is a recognition of the previously stated 
principle that pressing for .a legally proper settle-
ment is not improper merely because the circum-
stances of the party pressed are economically diffi-
cult. 
Ellison v. Pingree, 64 Utah 468, 231 Pac. 826 
f1'9124), is the only Utah Suprem~e 'Court case dealing 
with economic duress and strongly supports a con-
clusion that something more than financial embar-
rassment is necessary. Pingree was a wealthy cor-
porate officer and financier who made personal loans 
to the company to secure creditors. The corporation 
was in some difficulty and might otherwise have 
been pressed into receivership. Certain creditors of 
the company had threatened Pingree also with crim-
inal prosecution if he had not loaned the money to 
the company. Pingree sought to void the loan. In 
effect, Pingree claimed he had been coerced into ac-
cepting the business settlements. 
On appeal, Pingree's counsel in their brief con-
tended as to Pingree th.at :· 
" ... at the time he signed these contracts 
he was so environed, so circumstanced in fi-
n.ancial. matters that· he was. compelled on 
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account of the threats that were made !against 
him, to sign the contracts in controversy, and 
that if it had not been for this environment 
and these threats he never would have signed 
them." 
The Court held there was no sufficient duress 
shown to make out a prima facie case, although the 
threats were receivership and financial injury to the 
corporation and financial injury and criminal prose-
cution for Pingree. The Court stated: 
"This statement is made so often and in so 
m.any ways, that there is no room for doubt 
that it was not fear of imprisonment or loss 
of liberty, or of any personal injury, violence, 
or harm that induced Mr. Pingree to sign the 
contracts. He, however, said that what he was 
afraid of was that complaints against him 
might affect his credit and might hurt the 
credit of the institutions with which he was 
connected, namely, the various banks." 
The Court concluded: 
"In our judgment the district court was 
clearly right in holding that under Mr. Pin-
gree's own statements he utterly failed to es-
tablish duress as that term is understood and 
applied by the courts." 
Thus, Utah follows the rule that mere threat 
of business injury, even when coupled with a threat 
of criminal prosecution will not give rise to a cause 
of action. This is the general rule. Restatement, 
CONTRACTS, Section 49~3 Il1us. 1'5: Williston, 
OONTRA'CT·s, Rev. Ed. Section 1608. 
The .appellant cannot, by calling money "Prop-
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erty", prevail in any sense. First, because the his-
torical setting of th·e law of duress amply sustains 
the contention that duress of property, meant chat-
tels owned by the person claiming duress. 1 Black-
stone, ~coMMEN'TARTE'S '181; Berger v. Bonnell 
Motor Co., 4 N.J. Misc. 589, 133 Atl. 778; Cobb v. 
Charter, 32 Conn. 350 (1865); Cowley v. Fabien, 
204 N.Y. 566, 97 N.E. 458 (1912); Woodward, 
QUASI CONTRACTS, Section 216; D.awson, supra, 
45 Mich. L. Rev~ 253, 254 (1947). Second, the ap-
pellant did not own anything; it may or may not 
have been entitled to money, but if so, it arose by 
contract and appellant only had right to recover if 
·he could show a right under the contract. Under 
each insurance contract, appellant bore the burden 
·of proof, and no set sum was payable. Clearly there-
fore, appellant's attempt to bring itself within the 
"duress of property" rule is erroneous. Finally, the 
Courts have consistently ruled a threat not to pay a 
contractual demand is not economic duress. This is 
hornbook law. Patterson, RESTITUTION, page 9 
(1950): 
"By the weight of authority, threatened 
breach of contract is held not to be duress, the 
remedy for breach of contract being deemed 
adequate to relieve the promisee of coercion." 
See Goebel v. Linn, 4 7 Mich. 489, 11 N.W. 284; Cable 
v. Foley, 4:5 Minn. 421, 47 N.W. 11'315 ·(refusal to 
pay ·plaintiff money which he needed to pay employ-
ees). 
As to. point 4 of appellant's brief, relating to 
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borrowing money, it has no basis in the record, but 
only goes to show that the economic difficulties of 
appellant were its own and not attributable to re-
spondents. 
As to point 5, the appellant indicates that a fact 
situlrution .exists. This misapp'lies the question of 
whether the conduct was economic duress, which is a 
question of law. As noted in The Government Con-
tractor, supra, page 6: 
" ... whether the events and circumstances 
you allege as constituting duress really oc-
curred-these are questions of fact. 
"Finding th.at such events did occur-do 
they spell 'economic duress'? This is a ques-
tion of law." 
See Meyer v. Gu.ardian Trust Co., 296 Fed .. 789 
(1924): 
"What constitutes duress is a matter of law." 
The summary judgment admits the evidence 
that is now before the Cou-rt. The question, there-
fore, is does this amount to ·duress? T'his is a question 
of law which from the cases and authorities it clearly 
appears the trial court correctly ruled against the 
appellant. 
POINT III 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN GRANT-
ING SUMMARY JUDGMENT. 
The evidence was before the trial court, and it 
was a proper forum to rule on whether duress was 
present, or whether a tender should have been made. 
This being so, all other questions are irrelevant if 
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tender should have been m.ade or if actionable duress 
was not present. Both of these questions, from what 
has been set out before, must be answered against 
the appellant. Indeed, the case of Reliable Furniture 
Co. v. Fidelity Guaranty Ins. Underwriters, Inc., 14 
Utah 2d 169,380 P. 2d 135 (1963), where this Court 
sustained a motion for summary judgment, remov-
ing Fidelity from the case, would compel as much 
in this case. 
The question of the agency of the alleged acting 
persons is rendered immaterial; however, it is 
enough to note that a pretrial, the appellant ad-
mitted that there was no evidence that Day had 
joint authority to serve both companies or joint 
duties. The only evidence is that a general .agency 
agreement with Day's company had been entered 
into some years before. But, this is not enough to 
show agency to act in this case, but is merely the 
right to sell or issue policies and otherwise act as a 
general insurance agent. 
The posture of the case was properly one for 
summary ju·dgment; Dupler v. Yates, 10 Utah 2d 
251, 351 P. 2d 624 (1960), and this Court should 
affirm. 
CONCLUSION 
The appellant has raised several points, but few 
issues, on appeal. Most of the appellant's contentions 
are unsupported by the record, and therefore afford 
no means by which this Court could review the 
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claimed error. What is before this Court is the fail-
ure of the appellant to tender return of the money 
which was the subject of the alleged duress compro-
mise. In the .absence of a return or proper tender, 
the instant action was properly dismissed. Addi-
tionally, the trial court correctly ruled that the fact 
situation before it did not constitute economic duress. 
This being the legal basis of the appellant's claim 'for 
relief, the trial court correctly granted summary 
judgment. This Court should affirm. 
Respectfully submitted, 
REX J. HANSON 
515 Kearns Building 
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